Introduction
Finitism, intuitionism, constructivism, formalism, predicativism, structuralism, objectivism, platonism; foundationalism, anti-foundationalism, first orderism; constructive type theory, Cantorian set theory, proof theory; top down principles or building up from below-framework commitments, that is, ideology, permeates the logician's mathematical life. Such commitments set * This paper is based on a series of conversations with Jouko Väänänen. in early and are-usually-final: lines are drawn in the sand, and a working life is mapped out.
Of course, not all logicians are attracted to dogma. Some are fascinated by the space between theories, by points of data downplayed by this or that theoretical stance, or left out altogether. Their approach is pantheistic and ecumenical, and, with respect to foundations in particular, opportunistic and localized. Their attitude is critical, not toward any particular logical method, but toward the idea of omniscience. Neutrality is not a goal in itself; bordercrossing logicians are willing to take ideology seriously where they find it effective-it is just that they rarely find it so.
We might call such a perspective the "Logic without Borders" point of view. In the below we will recount some episodes in border-crossing, pieces of mathematics chosen almost arbitrarily from the work, career and conversation of the dedicatee of this volume, Jouko Väänänen.
We will see that a key concept turns out to be definability-and indeed, what is more important than the question of what we can say? As Väänänen puts it in his "Pursuing Logic without Borders": 1 We were persuaded by the idea that model theory, set theory and recursion theory are just different approaches to the same goal, understanding definability.
First Episode: Model Theory
Should model theory have borders? Countability, or more precisely, the border between the "genuinely" uncountable as opposed to the "only apparently" uncountable, separates pure model theory, i.e. that part of the subject which is relatively free of entanglement with set theory, from the rest. Logicians 1 in this volume on one side ask the question: why resort to set theory for studying the apparently marginal, the outlying cases, when there is so much work to do in the cases where set-theoretic methods are (in general) not needed, i.e. in the area of (sufficiently) stable and also in the area of o-minimal models? While the border-crossing logician will take a different view of the term "marginal,"
at least insofar as it is used as a synonym for "entangled with set theory." "nonpathological" and "set-theoretical," or, finally, "interesting" and "too general." But this is precisely where ideological borders emerge. As to undecidability, the border-crossing logician sees undecidability as a richness, a welcome elaboration of the basic picture. As for "interesting" and "too general," for the border-crossing logician "too general" is never a term of criticism, if all that is meant by "too general" is that one's reply to the question, what structures should one study? is simply "all of them." has a winning strategy for all countable α, then II has a winning strategy in the original Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game of length ω, and the models are isomorphic. As the models are not isomorphic, there must be a countable α such that player II does not have a winning strategy, and then by the GaleStewart theorem, which implies that these games are determined, player I does have a winning strategy. The smallest such α measures the distance
A Remark of Sacks
9 See Scott, [12] . 10 the anti-isomorphism player, sometimes called the "spoiler" 11 The idea of thinking of ordinals as measures of potential infinity and of trees as measures of potential countability, is presented first in [6] ; see also [17] .
12 the isomorphism player, sometimes called the "duplicator"
of the models A and B from being isomorphic. The bigger α is the closer they are to being isomorphic. This gives a hierarchy in terms of countable ordinals. On each level α of the hierarchy there are the pairs of countable models where α is the "watershed," the boundary where the advantage in the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game slides from player II to player I. With all clocks less than α player II, the "isomorphism player," is able to survive without losing, but once the clock is started from α (or bigger), player I is able to find the difference in the models and manifest the non-isomorphism by winning the game. All elements of this game are quite absolute.
The point is that this fails in uncountable models. When one uses countable partial isomorphisms to investigate uncountable models, one needs trees (an analogue of ordinals) which have non-trivial set theoretic properties. So set theory becomes entangled here with model theory.
To see this, consider the Ehrenfeucht-Fraïssé game of length ω 1 between non-isomorphic models A and B of cardinality ℵ 1 . Clearly player I has a winning strategy, as before, because he can list the models in ω 1 moves and then he must win because no isomorphism exists. In analogy to the countable case we again modify the game by adding the clause that player I has to go up a tree, which has no uncountable branches, while he plays. This tree is like a clock which ticks up the tree and stops when the branch ends. He can go up only countably many steps so the game is countable, but it is potentially uncountable in the sense that there is no bound on the countable length of the game. As before, in general, for small trees player I will not have a winning strategy. How big must the tree be in order that I wins this does not give determinacy for these games.
Here is an example of a non-trivial and novel set-theoretical analysis which was and is needed to work out the properties of such trees, and this has immediate implications for the model theory of uncountable structures. For example, as the work of Hyttinen, Shelah, Tuuri and others has shown, the extent to which the non-isomorphism of uncountable elementarily equivalent models can measured by trees is closely related to the stability theoretic properties of the first order theory of the models. Symbiosis was developed by Väänänen in order to, as he puts it, "expose the nature of the logic"; to "uncover the set-theoretical commitments of the logic, its content, its strength, even its reference." Symbiosis signifies codependence-in the benign sense of the term-and is a form of entanglement.
Recent debates about the foundational virtues of second order logic vs. set 13 See [5] .
theory, for example, decry the entanglement of set theory with second order logic, insofar as it is admitted to exist at all. 14 In fact, as Väänänen shows, not only is there nothing pernicious here, second order logic (denoted SOL)
is actually symbiotic with set theory, even in the technical sense of the term defined below-a predicament, possibly, for those who feel compelled, on foundational grounds, to make a choice between the two formalisms.
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The technical definition of symbiosis is as follows. First some notation.
By a "predicate" we mean a formula of set theory, typically "x is a cardinal"
or "x is the power-set of y". If a predicate P is added to the language of set theory as a (definable) new symbol, then a Σ 1 (P )-predicate means a Σ 1 -formula in the vocabulary {∈, P }. A ∆ 1 (P )-predicate is a Σ 1 (P )-predicate
sentence of a logic L * and L is a subset of the (many-sorted) vocabulary of ϕ, then the projection of ϕ to L is the class of reducts of models of ϕ to L .
A model class is said to be ∆-definable in L * if it is a projection of a sentence of L * and also its complement is. Now the definition: Definition 1. A logic L * is symbiotic with a predicate P of set theory if the predicate "ϕ ∈ L * " and the predicate "M |= L * ϕ" are Σ 1 (P ) and ∆ 1 (P )
respectively, and in addition, a model class
What symbiosis tells us about a logic L * is that its truth predicate is "recursive" in the predicate P , in the generalized sense of being ∆ 1 (P ). The class K P is defined as follows:
Definition 2. Suppose P is n-ary. The model class K P consists of models (M, E, a 1 , ..., a n ) isomorphic to some (M , ∈, a 1 , ..., a n ) such that M is a 14 See for example [13] . 15 See below for the proof that SOL is symbiotic with set theory. See also [15] .
transitive set and P (a 1 , ..., a n ) holds.
Barwise's concept of an absolute logic is related to symbiosis but is not the same. 16 An absolute logic as defined by Barwise requires the satisfaction predicate to be ∆ 1 , but without extra predicates. In the generalization of the concept introduced by Väänänen one adds the predicate P as a kind of "oracle."
For example, there is a symbiosis between the Härtig-quantifier and the predicate x = Cd(y) ("the cardinality of y is x"). First of all, as Lindström showed in [9] , the class of well-ordered models is a relativized reduct (i. A kind of ultimate symbiosis is the symbiosis of second order logic with the power-set operation "x is the power set of y," as was mentioned, and as is proved below.
Once one begins to look for symbiosis, one finds it everywhere! For example, as Väänänen points out, symbiosis is not limited to infinite models, but happens in the area of finite models too. To see this, recall that a class of finite models is recursive iff it is ∆-definable in the above sense in first order logic (denoted F O) in the context where all models considered are finite.
So here a computational definability concept, namely "recursive," coincides with a model-theoretic definability concept. Moreover, due to a result 17 H(κ) denotes the set of sets of hereditary cardinality less than κ. Thus HC is H(ℵ 1 ).
of Fagin, a class of finite models is existential second order definable iff it is NP. 18 Finally, a class of finite ordered models is definable in Fixpoint logic iff it is PTIME.
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A beautiful case of symbiosis for a logic which is strictly between first order logic and second order logic is the extension of first order logic by the well-ordering quantifier First of all, since second order logic is closed under negation, it is enough to show that the satisfaction predicate is Σ 1 with respect to the power-set operation. This is entirely standard.
The power-set operation is needed for the semantics of the second order quantifiers. Conversely, we have to show that the class of transitive sets equipped with the power-set operation is definable in second order logic with extra predicates. The first observation is that well-foundedness, and hence transitivity, can be defined (up to isomorphism) in second order logic. After this is it easy to use a second order quantifier to say that that power-set operation on the transitive set is really the full power-set operation.
In the first order case the symbiosis of F O with set theory takes 21 personal communication place on the level of Kripke-Platek set theory with urelements, denoted KPU − , without the axiom of infinity. 22 So a model class is definable in first order logic (when we think the universe of each model consisting of urelements) iff it is ∆ 1 in KPU − . The moral of the story is that first order logic is so weak that its symbiosis with set theory takes place on the level of the weak set theory
Another way of presenting the entanglement of second order logic with set theory is laid out by Väänänen in his 2001 and 2012 papers [16] , and [18] . Here set theory and second order logic are presented as analogs, or reflections of each other-avatars, to use Michael Harris's terminology 23 -kindred logical productions crystallized by the intention of the logician as he inclines toward this or that precisification of the mathematician's natural language discourse. As Väänänen puts it in that paper:
We study two metatheories of mathematics: first order set theory and second order logic. It is often said (e.g. in [13] ), that second 22 See J. Akkanen, [1] . 23 and Grothedieck's, Deligne's and others. Apparently the word has become a term of art in the field. Harris quotes Grothedieck on avatars:
Inspired by certain ideas of Serre, and also by the wish to find a certain common "principle" or "motif" for the various purely algebraic "avatars" that were known, or expected, for the classical Betti cohomology of a complex algebraic variety, I had introduced towards the beginning of the 60s the notion of "motif". 27 This is called "internal categoricity" in [18] . 28 The result uses Cohen forcing. See [4] for details. 29 The result concerning inaccessible cardinals is due to Zermelo, and the result on measurable cardinals is due to D. Scott. The result concerning strong cardinals is due to
Magidor. The large cardinal sequence begins above ω. See [10] .
dinal is a singular strong limit cardinal.
The analysis goes deeper. One can ask, of the predicate "ϕ is a second order characterization of a structure," what is its complexity? It is shown in [18] that the predicate is the conjunction of a Σ 2 -complete and a Π 2 -complete property of ϕ. As such, it is not itself Σ 2 or Π 2 , a fact which has very important foundational consequences:
So recognizing whether a candidate second order sentence is a second order characterization of some structure is so complex a problem that it cannot (by the Proposition above) be reduced to truth [of the form] A |= ϕ * in any particular second order characterizable structure A. It encodes a solution to propositions of the type |= ϕ * . So in complexity it is above all the particular truths A |= ϕ * and on a par with, but not equivalent to |= ϕ * .
The whole framework of the second order view takes the concept of a second order characterizable structure as its starting point.
In the case of familiar classical structures we can easily write the second order characterizations. But if we write down an arbitrary attempt at a second order characterization, the problem of deciding whether we were successful is in principle harder than the problem of finding what is true in the structure, if the sentence indeed characterizes some structure.
This actually supports, because it emphasizes the individuality of particular structures, forms of structuralism which specialize to the second order view as laid out in [18] -a view which is built on the idea that second order validity is not reducible to truth in any one second order characterizable structure.
At the same time a weakness of the view becomes visible: does the number theorist who is looking for integer solutions to Diophantine equations really work with a completely different structure than the analyst who works with complex numbers? Are not the integers rather a substructure of the complex numbers? It seems counterintuitive that, e.g. Dedekind's embedding of the natural numbers into the integers, and of these into the rationals, and of these into the reals, and finally of these into the complex numbers, is a wrong picture.
Conclusion
We began with Weil's recommendation of a passage from the Bhagavad-Gita.
We want to say that here too one achieves knowledge and indifference at the same time-or perhaps it would be more correct to say that for the bordercrossing logician, his indifference is actually the source of his knowledge. To him, the fine-structural, set-theoretical focus both on logic, and on logics; the development of logical frameworks which are not so much groundings as systems of avatars; the attempt to expose matters of reference and of content, while all the while remaining unmoved by ideological pressures. . . this is the logical life worth living.
